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(b) For the purposes of this section, the term “State” means the several States and Alaska, Hawaii, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia.

There are several different principles of law that govern interpretation of the two definitions of “State” set out above, but probably the more concise is “Inclusio unius est exclusion alterius”, defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, as follows:

Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. The inclusion of one is the exclusion of another. The certain designation of one person is an absolute exclusion of all others. Burgin v. Forbes, 293 Ky. 456, 169 S.W.2d, 321, 325. This doctrine decrees that where law expressly describes particular situation to which it shall apply, an irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted or excluded was intended to be omitted or excluded.

Kevin McC v. Mary A, 123 Misc.2d 148 N.Y.S.2d, 116, 118.

The definition of “State” at 4 USC § 111(d) clearly applies only within the geographical United States subject to Congress’ Article IV § 3.2 legislative jurisdiction—Congress’ “special” or limited jurisdiction. Therefore, the Buck Act does not apply to the Union of several States party to the Constitution as they are not territories or possessions of the United States. All examples in the definition are of federal territories. When the definition employs the term “includes”, it can be expanded only to the class, not anything outside the class demonstrated by example. Since 4 USC § 111(d) does not mention the several States, and does not name any of the several States as a class example, “[they were] intended to be omitted or excluded.”

On the other hand, 4 USC § 112(d) specifically includes the several States along with the District of Columbia, incorporated territories and insular possessions of the United States. This particular statute is the underlying authority for uniform laws relating to extradition, detainers, etc. Congress has legitimate constitutional authority to make these kinds of uniform rules, and this is one of the few acts classified in the United States Code that appears to issue under Congress’ general legislative power.

Now consider corresponding applications found in Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Per authority of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules, delegated at 28 USC § 2072, any statute in conflict with the rules is automatically repealed, so the following applications govern Title 18 of the United States Code, which is entitled, “Crimes and Criminal Procedure”:

“State” includes District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, territory and insular possession.

“Act of Congress” includes any act of Congress locally applicable to and in force in the District of Columbia, in Puerto Rico, in a territory or in an insular possession.

Given the Latin principle above, it is clear that these applications do not extend to the Union of several States party to the Constitution. They address only real estate under Congress’ Article IV § 3.2 municipal authority. Therefore, little or nothing in title 18 of the United States Code applies to the Union of several States and the population at large. Since all other penalty statutes in the United States Code fall back on Title 18 for procedure, the conclusion can be made that few if any criminal statutes classified in the United States Code are applicable to or within the several States except in federal enclaves such as military installations and national parks.

At 18 USC § 5, the “United States” is defined as follows:

§5. United States defined

The term “United States”, as used in this title in a territorial sense, includes all places and waters, continental and insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, except the Canal Zone.

There we find the word “territorial” - the territorial or geographical United States. The territorial United States is subject to Congress’ Article IV § 3.2 plenary power—the combined power of state and national, and in some instances, local government. The United States definition above, which is controlling for Title 18 of the United States Code, has application limited to territories and insular possessions of the United States.

Another clear clue is in the catchline for the Title 18 jurisdiction section, § 7: “Special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States defined.” The section defines eight jurisdictions, none of which apply to the several States beyond borders of federal enclaves. No jurisdiction defined in Title 18 reaches the Union of several States party to the Constitution.

It is also important to understand that Congress can enact laws applicable exclusively within Article IV § 3.2 jurisdiction that fall within Article I delegated power, but not exercise the Article I power for general application. This is basically what happened following across-the-board repeal of excise taxes via the revenue act of November 23, 1921. Excise tax with general application were legitimate under Article I § 8 delegated authority, but when they were reenacted, they were promulgated under Congress’ special authority within the geographical United States.

To see this, consider definitions of interstate and foreign commerce at 18 USC § 10:

§ 10. Interstate commerce and foreign commerce defined

The term ’interstate commerce", as used in this title, includes commerce between one State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia and another State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia.

The term “foreign commerce”, as used in this title, includes commerce with a foreign country.

The term “State” must have the definition or application set out in Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in order to maintain consistency and agreement: “’State’ includes the possession.” Examples in the 18 USC § 10 definition of interstate principle set out above governs: That which was omitted or excluded was intended to be omitted or excluded.

The Federal Register Act provides a convenient test for the allegation that Title 18 of the United States Code is applicable only in the geographical United States subject to Congress’ Article IV § 3.2 municipal authority. Of particular import, 44 USC § 1505(a)(1) stipulates that all “Presidential proclamations and Executive Orders, except those not having general applicability and legal effect or effective only against Federal agencies or persons in their capacity as officers, agents, or employees thereof,” must be published in the Federal Register. The subsection concludes, “For the purposes of this chapter every document or order which prescribes a penalty has general applicability and legal effect.”

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